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occur over the horizon of the security.
But here is the rub: the calculation
assumes that the real yields on both
securities are equal. Anything that
causes these two real returns to differ
will cause a bias in a TIPS-based mea-
sure of expected inflation.
In 1996, even before the Treasury started
issuing inflation-protected securities,
two economists, John Campbell and
Robert Shiller, suggested that if the Trea-
sury were to introduce such a security,
estimating expected inflation from it
would probably overstate actual
expected inflation by 50 to 100 basis
points. They reasoned that in addition to
compensation for expected inflation,
regular Treasury notes must also pay
compensation for inflation risk, or the
possibility that actual inflation will be
higher (or lower) than expected inflation. 
To understand their reasoning, consider
a 10-year Treasury note with a nominal
yield of 6 percent. Say everyone expects
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When inflation-indexed Treasury
securities were first introduced, econ-
omists hoped that they could be used
to measure expected inflation easily.
The only difference between securi-
ties that were indexed to inflation and
those that were not was thought to be
the extra compensation regular secu-
rities had to pay for what the market
thought inflation would be. By now it
is pretty clear that inflation-indexed
Treasuries differ from regular securi-
ties in other ways that show up in the
yields. This Commentary suggests
what these are and discusses a
method of correcting for them.
In 1997 the U.S. Treasury introduced a
new security. This security, a bond called
TIPS, for “Treasury Inflation-Protected
Securities,” is unique in the sense that its
returns are indexed to inflation, thus
promising bondholders a sure real return
over the life of the bond. Unlike nominal
Treasury notes, the real return of a TIPS
is fixed at auction time. The face value
and the coupon payments are indexed to
the inflation rate, so they grow at that
rate. Once the security is purchased,
increases in inflation do not reduce an
investor’s real return. This is much dif-
ferent than a nominal Treasury note,
where changes in inflation directly influ-
ence the realized real return of the bond.
The potential benefit of TIPS, however,
goes beyond the inflation protection
offered to bondholders. TIPS also
promise economists and policymakers a
potential way to tease out of the data the
market’s expectations for the future
course of inflation. In principle, sub-
tracting the real yield on TIPS from the
nominal yield of Treasury notes of the
same maturity should give policymakers
and economists a market-based measure
of expected inflation.
But thus far the results have been less
than encouraging. Ten-year expected
inflation rates derived from the TIPS
market have run approximately 50 basis
points lower than the inflation expecta-
tions of professional forecasters
(obtained from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters), and a full percentage
point lower than those of households (as
measured by the University of Michi-
gan’s Survey of Consumers; see figure
1). Of course, survey measures of
expected inflation have a multitude of
problems associated with them. How-
ever, the available evidence strongly
suggests that expected inflation derived
from the TIPS market underestimates
actual expected inflation. 
In this Economic Commentary we
explore why the TIPS-based measure
may have underestimated expected infla-
tion. We show that there are two counter-
vailing factors influencing the measure.
First, inflation risk, in and of itself,
implies that TIPS-based expected infla-
tion should overstate actual expected
inflation. Second, and even more impor-
tant, is the relative illiquidity of the TIPS
market, which leads TIPS-based
expected inflation to understate actual
expected inflation. 
We demonstrate a method of correcting
for the biases caused by the illiquidity of
the TIPS market and inflation risk. The
method produces a TIPS-based series
that can serve as a measure of expected
inflation, one that is potentially more
accurate than the unadjusted TIPS series.
Using the adjusted series, we examine
several interesting time periods. We
show instances where the new series
uncovers potential movements in
expected inflation that the uncorrected
TIPS series does not reveal. Similarly,
there are periods for which the uncor-
rected TIPS series incorrectly indicates
movements in expected inflation, but for
which the adjusted series suggests no
change occurred. 
■ Inflation Risk and TIPS-
Based Expected Inflation 
Remember that, in principle, expected
inflation should be accurately measured
by subtracting the real yield on TIPS
from the nominal yield on Treasury
notes of the same maturity. The reason it
is supposed to work this way is that the
nominal yield on Treasury notes consists
of a real return plus compensation for
the inflation rate that is expected toinflation to average 2.5 percent over the
next 10 years—but this is only what
they expect. Actual inflation could turn
out to be much lower, say 1.5 percent,
or much higher, say 3.5 percent. This
implies that the actual real yield from
holding the bond may be as low as 
2.5 percent or as high as 4.5 percent. On
average it may be 3.5 percent, but there
is an inflation risk associated with hold-
ing this bond that does not exist with an
inflation-indexed security such as TIPS.
Investors must be compensated for this
risk, and the result is that the real yield
of a nominal Treasury note tends to
exceed the real return of an inflation-
indexed security. Expected inflation
derived from the inflation-indexed secu-
rity would thus overstate actual
expected inflation. 
Campbell and Shiller then produced an
estimate of the inflation risk premium.
They first estimated historical inflation
volatility as a means of quantifying the
inflation risk people might be inclined to
expect, and then they combined that fig-
ure with existing measures of the com-
pensation that households require to
accept that sort of risk. The premium
they calculated was 50 to 100 basis
points, which led them to their prediction
that inflation-indexed securities would
overstate expected inflation by that
much. Given that TIPS appear to under-
state expected inflation by 50 basis
points, we have something of a puzzle.
■ Liquidity and the TIPS
Market
If we combine Campbell and Shiller’s
estimate of a 100-basis-point overstate-
ment of TIPS-based inflation expectations
with the 50-basis-point understatement
that is actually observed, it suggests that
the real yield on nominal Treasury notes
is 150 basis points lower than the real
yield on TIPS. Given that the real yield on
nominal Treasury notes is about 2.6 per-
cent, a real TIPS yield of over 4 percent is
quite large! We argue that the difference
can be explained as compensation for liq-
uidity risk. Although the TIPS market is
deepening, it does not approach the depth
of nominal Treasury notes, suggesting
that the liquidity risk for TIPS might be
important. While this liquidity risk also
exists for non-inflation-indexed Treasury
notes, it does so to a much reduced extent,
as markets for the notes are older and
more developed than for TIPS. 
Nominal Treasury notes are extremely
liquid instruments. If one were to buy a
10-year note today and sell it tomorrow,
one could do so without a large loss in
capital. The reason is that large and active
primary and secondary markets exist for
these securities. The secondary market is
extremely important because most buyers
of Treasury notes do not hold the notes to
maturity but sell them long before. It is
rare for an investor to buy a 10- or 30-
year note and still be holding onto it 10 or
30 years later. Circumstances change,
and an investor who wants a long-term
bond today does not necessarily want
that same bond tomorrow. 
Imagine the compensation an investor
would need if it were impossible to sell
a security once it was purchased. Obvi-
ously, investors can sell TIPS, but not
nearly as easily as regular Treasury
notes. This implies that investors in
TIPS must be compensated for the rela-
tive illiquidity of these securities. The
relative illiquidity of TIPS also intro-
duces uncertainty into their pricing,
which affects an investor’s return when
he or she sells the security early.
But can this extra liquidity risk explain
the missing 150 basis points? Unfortu-
nately, there are no good measures of
TIPS market liquidity. However, there is
a measure of the liquidity risk that is
associated with nominal Treasury notes.
We can safely assume that the liquidity
risk for TIPS is correlated with the small
liquidity risk that exists for regular nom-
inal Treasury notes. Basically, if there is
a small liquidity risk associated with
holding nominal Treasury securities,
there is an even larger liquidity risk
associated with holding TIPS. 
One measure of liquidity risk for nomi-
nal Treasury notes is the difference
between returns for securities of the
same maturity in the primary market
and the less liquid secondary market.
For example, the difference between the
return on a 10-year Treasury note pur-
chased in the primary market (“on-the-
run”) and the return on a 15-year Trea-
sury note with 10 years left purchased in
the secondary market (“off-the-run”)
provides a measure of the liquidity risk
associated with that instrument. This liq-
uidity risk does exist and since 1997 has
varied from a low of 8 basis points to a
high of 37 basis points. 
■ Liquidity Risk and Expected
Inflation
We can estimate the compensation
needed to insure against the liquidity
risk of TIPS by making three reasonable
conjectures. First, the liquidity risk for
TIPS is larger than the risk of off-the-
run nominal Treasury securities because
the TIPS market is less developed. Sec-
ond, the liquidity premium in the TIPS
market is correlated with the liquidity
premium in the nominal Treasury mar-
ket. The third conjecture relates the liq-
uidity risk of TIPS to the difference that
SOURCES:  University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers; Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters; and Bloomberg Financial Information
Services.
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ers’expected inflation (vertical
axis). Note that these variables are
negatively
correlated and that this relation-
ship is nonlinear. The figure
implies that if there were no liq-
uidity risk in the nominal Treasury
market, and thus no liquidity risk
in the TIPS market, expected
inflation derived from TIPS would
overstate actual expected inflation
by 95 basis points. Evidently this
overstatement arises from the
inflation risk associated with 
nominal Treasury securities and is
basically the size of the inflation
risk predicted by Campbell and
Shiller. As liquidity risk rises in
the nominal Treasury market, liq-
uidity risk in the TIPS market also
rises, so that TIPS-based expected
inflation understates actual
expected inflation. 
We use the relationship in figure 2
to correct for the bias in TIPS-
derived inflation expectations
caused by inflation risk and the
illiquidity of the TIPS market. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the difference
between the corrected series and
the uncorrected series (which is
obtained, as you may recall, by
subtracting real TIPS yields from
nominal Treasury yields). These
inflation measures are clearly
closely related but some interest-
ing differences do exist. 
First, our analysis suggests that
inflation over the next 10 years
will average around 2.5 percent to
2.6 percent. This is about the same
as was expected at the beginning
of 2002. Yet the uncorrected series
suggests that expected inflation
increased by around 85 basis
points from 2002 to the present.
Without the correction, you might
worry that the credibility of the
Federal Reserve to keep inflation
fairly low and stable was waning,
but with the correction, you might
conclude the opposite. 
A second divergent prediction for
the two series occurs in August
1998, after the Asian financial cri-
sis and at the beginning of the
Russian default crisis. Looking at
the uncorrected series, you might
mistakenly conclude that expected
inflation dropped precipitously
from just over 3 percent in mid-1997 to
around 0.8 percent in early 1999. Not
surprisingly, 
however, there were liquidity problems
with TIPS around the time and, to a
lesser extent, Treasury notes, which
affected the liquidity risk of both secu-
rities. The corrected series takes this
change in risk into account, dropping
from just over 3 percent to 1.5 percent. 
It is also worth pointing out that our
measure suggests that the uncorrected
series can also miss changes in
expected inflation. Long-term inflation
expectations dropped more heading
into the 2001 recession than the uncor-
rected series suggests. Also, from Jan-
uary 2004 to May 2004, our corrected
measure of expected inflation
increased by nearly 70 basis points,
possibly because of inflationary con-
cerns arising from the rapid growth in
the U.S. economy at the time. This
increase in inflation expectations was
reversed only after the initial federal
funds rate increase in the summer of
2004. After that, expected inflation
once again fell back to its long-term
average of around 2.6 percent. The up-
tick in inflation expectations before the
funds rate hike in June might not have
been noticed in the uncorrected series,
which increased only half as much
over the same time span.
■ Concluding Thoughts
This Economic Commentary has shown
a simple way of using TIPS to obtain a
reasonable estimate of expected infla-
tion. In particular, this estimate corrects
for the inflation risk associated with
nominal Treasury notes and the liquidity
risk associated with TIPS. Clearly there
are other factors that would influence the
accuracy of TIPS-based expected infla-
tion measures. The importance of these
factors, however, is likely to be very
small. (See an earlier Economic Com-
mentary by Ben Craig for a discussion
of the various factors influencing the
ability to use TIPS to estimate expected
inflation.) 
We emphasize that the success of TIPS
should not be judged on the basis of how
well they can be used to measure
expected inflation. Measuring expected
inflation is a potential side benefit of
these securities; it is not the reason they
were introduced. The very fact that their
popularity is increasing suggests that
they have fulfilled their primary pur-
pose—to provide investors with an 
inflation hedge.
FIGURE 2 EXPECTED INFLATION
SPREAD AND LIQUIDITY RISK
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TIPS inflation and SPF inflation.  The liquidity premium is calcu-
lated as the difference between off-the-run and on-the-run 10-year
Treasury security yields.
SOURCES: Bloomberg Financial Information Services; Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters;
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
SOURCES:  Bloomberg Financial Information Services; and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
is observed between two measures of
expected inflation—that reported in the
Survey of Professional Forecasters and
that derived from unadjusted TIPS
yields. We assume this difference is
largely driven by the liquidity risk. 
Figure 2 shows the historical relation-
ship between liquidity risk in the nomi-
nal Treasury market (horizontal axis)





Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted if the source is
credited. Please send copies of reprinted
material to the editor.
Charles T. Carlstrom is an economic advisor
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and Timothy S. Fuerst is an associate profes-
sor at Bowling Green State University.
The views expressed here are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or
its staff. 
Economic Commentary is published by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. To receive copies or to be
placed on the mailing list, e-mail your request
to 4d.subscriptions@clev.frb.org or fax it to
216-579-3050. Economic Commentary is also
available at the Cleveland Fed’s site on the
World Wide Web: www.clevelandfed.org/
research.
We invite comments, questions, and sugges-






John Y. Campbell and Robert J. Shiller,
1996. “A Scorecard for Indexed Gov-
ernment Debt,” NBER Working Paper,
no. 5587.
Ben R. Craig, 2003. “Why are TIPS
Yields so High? The Case of the Miss-
ing Inflation-Risk Premium,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic
Commentary, March 15.
William R. Emmons, 2000. “The Infor-
mation Content of Treasury Inflation-
Indexed Securities,” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Economic Review,
82(6): 25–38.
Brian Sack, 2000. “Deriving Inflation
Expectations from Nominal and Infla-
tion-Indexed Yields,” Journal of Fixed
Income, 10: 1–12.
Pu Shen and Jonathan Corning, 2001.
“Can TIPS Help Identify Long-Term
Inflation Expectations?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
Economic Review, 86 (4): 61–87.